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USUAL BAGGAGE: AN EXCEPTION TO THE
CARRIER'S RIGHT TO LIMIT LIABILITY
Under the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended, interstate com-
mon carriers may contract with their passengers1 and shippers
2 to
limit the extent of their liability, for loss or damage to their passengers'
baggage or their shippers' freight, entrusted to them for carriage. 3
However, before this limitation will be upheld, carriers must per-
form certain stipulated conditions, including the proper presentation
of notice of their liability limitation scheme to their passengers and
shippers.4 For over half a century courts have recognized as valid
those Interstate Commerce Commission approved liability limitation
schemes which employ such practices as posting notices of alternative
tariff rates in conspicious places in terminals and printing liability
limitation contracts on baggage receipts and passenger tickets. These
courts have held that such schemes provide the traveler with a fair
1Zeidenberg v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 3 Conn. Cir. 176, 2o9 A. 697 (1965);
Neece v. Richmond Greyhound Lines, Inc., 246 N.C. 547, 99 S.E.2d 756 (1957);
Royalty v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 75 Ohio App. 322, 62 N.E.2d 200
(1945); Cray v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 177 Pa. Super. 275, 11o A.2d
892 (1955); Greyhound Corp. v. Stevens, 413 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
2Chandler v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 374 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1967); Strick-
land Transp. Co. v. United States, 334 F.2d 172 (5 th Cir. 1964); Holmes v. National
Van Lines, Inc., 55 Wash. 2d 861, 350 P.2d 864 (1960).
'Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1964). Interstate Commerce Act,
.49 U.S.C. § 319 (1954) applies § 20(11) to common carriers by motor vehicle.
'Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1964) makes an apparent dis-
tinction between passenger baggage and other property shipped by interstate car-
riers, even though the Act does allow carriers to limit their liability with respect
to both categories. See note io infra. Despite this apparent distinction, case law
indicates that the conditions precedent to the validity of liability limitation schemes
for both categories are very similiar. See text at page 4 and cases cited note i8 infra.
The conditions which must be met before liability can be limited include:
(a) Baggage carriers must file a tariff with and receive I.C.C. approval. Zeidenberg
v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 3 Conn. Cir. 176, 2o9 A.2d 697, 699 (1965); Carriers, of
freight must obtain I.C.C. approval authorizing a scheme to limit liability based
on either declared or released value. Chandler v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 374
F.2d 129, 134 (4 th Cir. 1967). (b) Proper notice of the liability limitation scheme
must be provided. Zeidenberg v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 3 Conn. Cir. 176, 2o9 A.2d
697, 699 (1965) (passenger case); Chandler v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 374 F.2d
129, 137 (4 th Cir. 1967) (shipper case). (c) A showing by the carrier that it received
property in the capacity of a common carrier. Neece v. Richmond Greyhound
Lnes, Inc., 246 N.C. 547, 99 S.E.2d 756, 761 (1957) (language of paragraph covers
both baggage and freight carriers). (d) The passenger must not have contracted
for greater protection. Zeidenberg v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 3 Conn. Cir. 176, 209
A.2d 697, 699 (1965) (passenger case); Holmes v. National Van Lines, Inc., 55
Wash. 2d 861, 350 P.2d 864, 866 (1g6o) (shipper case). 1
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opportunity to choose the desired coverage for his baggage.5 Recently,
however, the Queens County Civil Court of New York held in Chris
v. Greyhound Bus Lines that such practices do not of themselves
constitute adequate notice. The court seems to impose absolute liability
on interstate common carriers for loss or damage to the "average
traveler's usual baggage."
In Chris, a piece of luggage containing personal clothing and
belonging to the plaintiff passenger was lost by the defendant
carrier, a bus line. The plaintiff sued for the full value of her lost
luggage and its contents. The carrier established the usual defense
in this type of case by proving that the plaintiff had available to her
extra coverage thru a choice of rates in accordance with their rate
tariff, as established by the Interstate Commerce Commission. She
could have obtained full coverage by declaring the value of her
luggage and paying the additional fee. Since her baggage went aboard
free pursuant to the passenger ticket, the carrier argued she should
be limited in her recovery, because there was a limitation of liability
under the free rate. However, the court permitted the plaintiff to
recover the full value of her luggage nothwithstanding the liability
limitation in the rate tariff.
The court based its decision upon its observation that the option
of rates and insurance coverage is an "unrealistic" and "dormant"
practice due to the overcrowded, "rush and crush" atmosphere of
today's carrier terminals. It went on to point out that it was unfair
to assume that a traveler rushing to meet a schedule would read
posted notices or contracts printed on a baggage receipt or passenger
ticket. The court also indicated that even if such notices and con-
tracts were read by the traveler and he was aware of his options, it
is unrealistic to assume that he could exercise these options because
of the long lines and "rush and crush" of terminals when the traveler
has to board a departing vehicle. The court stated that the "whole
concept of baggage handling, baggage liability and related tariff and
rate regulations should be given a fresh appraisal by the legislative
bodies....,, Therefore it concluded, that since the legislative bodies
5Zeidenberg v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 3 Conn. Cir. 176, 209 A.2d 697, 699
(1965) (passenger case); Patton v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 75 Ohio App.
oo, 6o N.E.2d 945, 946 (1944) (passenger case); Greyhound Corp. v. Stevens, 43
S.W.2d 439, 448 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (passenger case); accord, Chandler v. Aero
Mayflower Transit Co., 374 F.2d 129, 137 (4th Cir. 1967) (shipper case); Holmes
v. National Van Lines, Inc., 55 Wash. 2d 861, 350 P.2d 864 (1960) (shipper case).
657 Misc. 2d 129, 291 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Civ. Ct. 1968).
7291 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
7291 N.Y.S.2d at 967.
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have not yet acted, it should intervene to protect the "unwary public."
The court did not nullify the carrier's liability limitation scheme
with respect to all types of people. The court did not concern itself
with shippers as distinguished from passengers with baggage; and
not even all type of passengers are included, only the "average
traveler" and his "usual baggage." Judge Finz did not disagree with
the decision in Hartzberg v. New York Central Railroad Co.,8 where
the liability limitation scheme was upheld on facts similar to Chris,
but he distinguished that case on the basis of the contents of the
baggage. The contents in Hartzberg were commercial jewelry and
diamonds valued at $169,o78.47; In Chris the contents were "usual"
items of personal clothing.
Carrier liability for loss or damage to baggage and freight en-
trusted to it for carriage in interstate commerce is under the ex-
clusive control of federal law.9 The Interstate Commerce Act, §
20(11)10 provides in general that any common carrier in interstate
8181 Misc. 129, 41 N.Y.S.2d 345 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
OSilvers v. Pennsylvania R.R., 89 N.J. Super. 475, 215 A.2d 556, 558 (1965);
Royalty v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 75 Ohio App. 322, 62 N.E.2d 200
(1945); Cray v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 177 Pa. Super. 275, 11o A.2d
892, 893 (1955).
"0Any common carrier ... receiving property for transportation ... shall issue
a receipt or bill of lading therefor, and shall be liable to the lawful holder
thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it...
and no contract, receipt, rule, regulation, or other limitation of any
character whatsoever shall exempt such common carrier... from the
liability imposed; ... notwithstanding any limitation of liability or limita-
tion of the amount of recovery or representation or agreement as to value
in any such receipt or bill of lading, or in any contract, rule, regulation,
or in any tariff filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission; and any
such limitation, without respect to the manner or form in which it is
sought to be made is declared to be unlawful and void: ... Provided,
however, That the provisions hereof respecting liability for full actual
loss, damage, or injury ... shall not apply, first, to baggage carried on
passenger trains or boats, or trains or boats carrying passengers (emphasis
supplied); second, to property ... received for transportation concerning
which the carrier shall have been or shall be expressly authorized or re-
quired by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission to establish and
maintain rates dependent upon the value declared in writing by the
shipper or agreed upon in writing as the release value of the property, in
which case such declaration or agreement shall have no other effect than
to limit liability and recovery to an amount not exceeding the value so
declared or released.., and any tariff schedule which may be filed with
the commission pursuant to such order shall contain specific reference
thereto and may establish rates varying with the value so declared and
agreed upon.
Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1964) as cited in Neece v. Richmond
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 246 N.C. 547, 99 S.E.2d 756, 759-6o (1957).
Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 319 (1964) makes § 20(11) of this title
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commerce receiving property for carriage must issue a receipt and be
liable to lawful holder of such receipt for all loss or damage to such
property."' No receipt, contract or other device will be allowed to
exempt such common carrier.'
2
However, the Interstate Commerce Act does allow common car-
riers to limit the extent of their liability if they meet certain stipulated
conditions. 13 In order to be able to limit their liability, carriers must
first file a rate tariff with the Interstate Commerce Commission and
obtain its approval.' 4 Such a rate tariff must provide to the shipper
or passenger a choice of rates15 with accompanying, graduated insur-
ance coverage commensurate with the particular rate. 10 The Interstate
Commerce Act specifically states that such rates which apply to a
shipper's freight are to be "[D]ependent upon the value declared...
by the shipper or agreed upon... as the released value of the prop-
erty...."1 7 It is not clear whether this section of the Interstate Com-
merce Act applies with equal force to passengers' baggage. However,
case law provides that passengers will be limited in their recovery
for lost or damaged baggage unless they declare the value of their
applicable "[Wjith respect to common carriers by motor vehicle with like force
and effect as in the case of those persons to which such provisions are specifically
applicable." Cray v. Pennsylvania Lines, Inc., 177 Pa. Super. 275, 11o A.2d 892,
894 (1955).
"Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 2001) (1964) provides that a carrier is
liable for "any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it." This
absolute liability is a codification of the
common-law rule that a carrier, though not an absolute insurer, is liable
for damage to goods transported by it unless it can show that the damage
was caused by '(a) the act of God; (b) the public enemy; (c) the act of the
shipper himself; (d) public authority; (e) or the inherent vice or nature
of the goods.'
Chandler v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 374 F.2d 129, 132 n.2 (4th Cir. 1967);
see Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134, 137 (1964).
'Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1964); Chandler v. Aero May-
flower Transit Co., 374 F.2d 129, 134 (4th Cir. 1967).
"See note 4 supra, for cases delineating these conditions.
"Chandler v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 374 F.2d 129, 134 (4th Cir. 1967);
Zeidenberg v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 3 Conn. Cir. 176, 209 A.2d 697, 699 (1965);
Greyhound Corp. v. Stevens, 413 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966); Holmes
v. National Van Lines, Inc., 55 Wash. 2d 861, 350 P.2d 864, 866 (1960).
"1Chandler v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 374 F.2d 129, 137 (4th Cir. 1967)
(shipper case); Cray v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 177 Pa. Super. 275,
i1o A.2d 892, 895 (1955) (passenger case).
:"In other words, the liability limitation scheme is built directly into the rate
schedule. Cray v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 177 Pa. Super. 275, 110
A.2d 892, 895 (1955); Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Wells, 41 A.2d 837
(D.C. Mun. Ct. App. 1945).
1749 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1964). For an explanation of "released value" see Strick-
land Transp. Co. v. United States, 334 F.2d 172, 174-76 (5th Cir. 1964).
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baggage and pay a rate commensurate with the declared value.18 Thus,
when a passenger or shipper declares the value of his baggage or
freight there is a choice of rates and insurance protection available
to him. Connected with the lowest rate is the lowest carrier liability.
The rationale underlying this scheme has been stated to permit the
carrier to obtain compensation for the responsibility assumed.' 9
Once the rate tariff has been approved by the I.C.C., there must
be an agreement between the shipper and carrier,20 or passenger and
carrier,21 to limit the carrier's liability. In determining whether or
not an agreement has been reached, principles of contract law are
to be applied.2 2 Thus, the assent of the shipper or passenger to the
contract is effective to make the contract binding only if given after
a fair opportunity to choose between higher or lower liability.23
Proper notice of the liability limitation scheme is necessary to provide
the shipper with knowledge of the differences in rates and insurance
protection, and thus provide him with a fair opportunity to choose.
In Cray v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc.,24 it was held that
reference to tariff regulations on tickets and baggage checks, and post-
ing of regulations in conspicuous locations on ticket and baggage
checking windows was sufficient to provide a fair opportunity for the
passenger with baggage.
2 5
However, if notice of the tariff regulations and the liability limita-
tion scheme are found inadequate, the court will not allow the scheme
TZeidenberg v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 3 Conn. Cir. 176, 20o9 A.2d 697 (1965);
Royalty v. Southeastern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 75 Ohio App. 322, 62 N.E.2d 200
(1945); Cray v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 177 Pa. Super. 275, 1O A.2d
892 (1955).
IDBoston & Maine R.R. v. Hooker, 233 U.S. 97, i9 (1914); Cray v. Pennsylvania
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 177 Pa. Super. 275, 11o A.2d 892, 895 (1955).
2Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1964).
1 Zeidenberg v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 3 Conn. Cir. 176, 20o9 A.2d 697, 699
(1965).
-2Chandler v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 374 F.2d 129, 134 (4th Cir. 1967).
=Chandler v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 374 F.2d 129, 135 (4th Cir. 1967)
(shipper case); General Precision, Inc. v. Burnham Van Service, Inc., 46 Msc. 2d
586, 26o, N.Y.S.2d 3o8, 316 (Sup. Ct. 1965). But cf. Kellett v. Alaga Coach Lines,
Inc., 34 Ala. App. 152, 37 So. 2d 137, 139 (1948) which states the presumption that
the passenger knows of the tariff and limitation; Cray v. Pennsylvania Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 177 Pa. Super. 275, 11o A.2d 892, 896 (1955) which sets forth the
proposition that a passenger may be provided with a fair opportunity to choose
without actually being informed.
2'177 Pa. Super. 275, 11o A.2d 892, 896 (1955).
-5Some courts have held that this method of providing notice is mandatory
in order to limit the carrier's liability. Zeidenberg v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 3
Conn. Cir. 176, 2o9 A.2d 697, 699 (1965); Patton v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines,
75 Ohio App. ioo, 6o N.E.2d 945, 946 (1944).
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to protect the delinquent carrier, and will grant the shipper or pas.
senger a full value recovery.26 However, such action by the court
would only affect the particular case before the court, and would not
permanently abolish the limitation scheme. This is so because when
the carrier again provides proper notice, its rate tariff and liability
limitation scheme will be upheld.27
In Chris, Judge Finz appears to have based his decision upon this
principle of notice. However, it seems that he expanded the principle
beyond its normal case by case application by indicating that proper
notice in overcrowded "rush and crush" carrier terminals is impos-
sible.28 In saying that notice is impossible Chris may be read as
abolishing liability limitation schemes since proper notice is a condi-
tion precendent to their validity.
There are, however, several questions as to the scope of Judge
Finz's decision. First, the opinion indicates that proper notice is im-
possible in the "rush and crush" of today's "overcrowded" terminals.
It is not entirely clear whether Judge Finz was taking judicial notice
of the fact that all terminals are overcrowded or whether he intended
that his decision apply only to those terminals which are in fact
overcrowded. There is language in the case which indicates that he
intended to limit the decision only to terminals which are over-
crowded in fact: "Accordingly, and in the posture of this case I
find that the plaintiff was wronged... and ... is entitled to judgment
in the full amount....-29
There may also be a second limitation on the scope of Chris. In
saying that proper notice could not be given in the atmosphere of
21New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128, 135 (1953) (passenger
case); Chandler v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 374 F.2d 129, 137 (4th Cir. 1967)
(shipper case); Shirazi v. Greyhound Corp., 145 Mont. 421, 401 P.2d 559, 561 (1965)
(dictum) (passenger case); see Greyhound Corp. v. Stevens, 413 S.W.2d 439, 444-45,
447 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966) (passenger case) which interpreted New York, N.H. &
H.R.R. v. Northnagle, supra, as disallowing the limitation scheme because the rail-
road failed to give the passenger a baggage receipt with the limitation thereon.
'-In each case, if the essential conditions have been met, including notice, then
the limitation will have effect. Zeidenberg v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 3 Conn. Cir.
176, 209 A.2d 697, 699 (1965); Patton v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 75 Ohio
App. ioo, 6o N.E.2d 945, 946 (1944).
1Judge Finz did not explicitly state that notice was impossible, but it may be
inferred from a reading of the case as a whole. He spoke of carrier terminal
atmosphere as "rush and crush" and "no opening and no closing." He mentioned
the "hurried movement of thousands throughout the day and night is a daily
occurrence." Finally, he mentioned that the tariff and limitation system existed
in fact only, and were dormant in practice. Chris v. Greyhound Bus Lines, 57
Misc. 2d 129, 291 N.Y.S.2d 964, 967 (Civ. Ct. 1968).
'Id. at 967.
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today's terminals, Judge Finz may not have intended to create a new
rule of law that notice is never possible. He may have intended only
to put the burden of proof on the defendant to show that there was
notice in fact. Thus, when a passenger sues a carrier for loss of his
baggage there would be a rebuttable presumption that notice was
nonexistent, and that the carrier is liable without limitation.
Judge Finz was careful to limit Chris to the "average traveler"
who has "usual baggage." Such passengers are the only ones who are
not limited by the tariff system with its liability scheme and who may
recover the full value of their belongings notwithstanding the fact
they have not paid any extra tariff. "Usual baggage" is apparently a
novel concept 30 and therefore raises problems for the future. By
distinguishing Hartzberg, Judge Finz made it clear that commercial
jewelry and diamonds valued at $169,078.47 are not "usual baggage"
but he gave no further clue as to the meaning of this term. Perhaps
this category could be partially defined with reference to the term
"baggage" which, at common law, included the luggage itself plus
a reasonable amount of wearing apparel.31 In Hannibal Railroad v.
Swift,3 2 the Supreme Court defined baggage as "a limited quantity
of articles as are ordinarily taken by travelers for their personal use
and convenience; such quantity depending of course upon the station
of the party, the object and length of the journey, and many other
considerations."
The Chris decision, with its many problems, would not have
been before the court if the Interstate Commerce Commission had
adopted a policy of withholding approval of carrier tariff regulations
until the minimum liability rate is set high enough to provide full
coverage for the average traveler's usual baggage. At present, that
rate is often set near $50.33 This figure seems scarcely adequate to
reimburse an average passenger for articles usually carried in transit.
If the minimum liability were set at a more realistic figure, most
average travelers would be fully protected.
3JResearch has not revealed the use of the term by any statute or any other
court.
3Neece v. Richmond Greyhound Lines, Inc., 246 N.C. 547, 99 S.E.2d 756,
762 (1957).
279 U.S. (12 Wall.) 262, 274 (1870).
"'In the following cases the limitation was set at $25. Zeidenberg v. Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 3 Conn. Cir. 176, 2o9 A.2d 697 (1965); Neece v. Richmond Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 246 N.C. 547, 99 S.E.2d 756 (1957); Royalty v. Southeastern Greyhound
Lines, Inc., 75 Ohio App. 322, 62 N.E.2d 200 (1945). $50 is the figure set in the
Southern Greyhound Lines Terminal, Lexington, Virginia. In Fennell v. Trailways,
169 So. 2d 858 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964), the state commission had set the limita-
tion at $ioo.
1969]
